

Title: HAYEK'S Rules: spontaneous or necessary?

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Abstract

The paper aims at retrieving a critic and philosophical view over F. A. Hayek's explanatory rules for the market's social order. His concept of "rule" is discussed (a) as for its usage on a critique of *a priori* ruling; (b) as generated by experience for the structuring of Hayek's theoretical system; (c) as being the necessary elements securing market order, therefore revealing a contradiction within Hayek's thought. As a counterweight for Hayek's rules, methodical, *a priori* laws are presented, an inheritance from Cartesian thought, whose constructivist rationalism is shown to be sharply criticised by Hayek, as he rejects any rational action determined by tangible, demonstrable truth. Hayek's Man is one that agrees to follow rules while being "*conscious of his impassable ignorance about the greatest part of the circumstances bringing about the effects of his activity.*" (Hayek, 1937) Ours, thus, is a world that cannot be rationally understood, a world where evolution continuously takes place, determined by selected, general, abstract rules that guide Man along his social apprenticeship, always leading society to a higher level of problem-solving ability and welfare. But so that market order may be thought of as being always kept, necessary rules are posited, which systematically make for competition to maintain itself. In this way is Hayek's thought shown in its ultra-rationalistic side, that is, in its contradiction. Hayek's rules are therefore presented as interesting from the standpoint of the discussion with heterodoxy, as well as founding a conservative theory of History, and a