The Uneven Costs of European Integration: Germany, Spain and the EU’s Mode of Development

by Blanca Lozano Navarro

European integration promised convergence between Member States, yet the divide between core and peripheral European countries has persisted. The most influential heterodox explanation comes from post-Keynesian economics, which traces it to domestic demand and current account imbalances (Stockhammer 2011). Here, I ask a complementary question: which institutional architecture made that asymmetry work, and who decides when its rules apply?

My argument is that integration fixed two of the rules of the game at the supranational level, money and competition, and left the rest to national governments. Adjustment therefore falls on nominal wages and state intervention, and hardest on the countries with the weakest position in the European division of labour. The asymmetry has lasted for decades because the EU’s regime of accumulation relies on it: an export-oriented centre sustained by the rest. That arrangement is now under strain. The fiscal rules were relaxed after the pandemic, and the framework was later partially modified. The question is who gets to use the room for manoeuvre this creates, and why it is distributed unequally. So far, the answer has been the centre, led by Germany.

Regulation Theory is a historical-institutional approach whose core idea is that long-run growth depends on a regime of accumulation, the pattern linking production, distribution, demand and investment, and on a mode of regulation, the set of institutions that keeps that pattern coherent. Five institutional forms are traditionally identified: the currency, the competition regime, the wage relation, the form of the state and the type of insertion in the international system. These forms are historic, institutionalised compromises born of social conflict. And, together, regime and regulation constitute a specific mode of development (Aglietta 1979; Lipietz 1986).

The European Union can be understood as a supranational mode of regulation in which a transnational coalition led by financial interests has prevailed by making financial markets indispensable for funding states (van Apeldoorn 2002; Bieling, Jäger and Ryner 2016; Boyer et al. 2023). Two institutional forms have moved to the supranational level: the currency, through the European Central Bank, and the competition regime, through the single market. Those related to the welfare state remain national but operate under supranational constraints. This creates a hierarchy: one institutional form is superior to another when changing it forces the others to adapt. Since no national government can alter the rules on money or competition, states must adjust to them through what they still control: the labour market and state intervention. How hard the adjustment bites depends on a country’s position in the division of labour between centre and periphery.

Germany and Spain illustrate two faces of the same mechanism. Germany demanded that its partners ‘improve their competitiveness’ while keeping its own market shares intact. Within the euro, weaker than a Deutschmark would have been, sustained wage moderation improved price competitiveness and held down domestic demand, pushing growth towards exports and reinforcing a pattern of technological specialisation. The same moderation kept German inflation low and, under a single monetary policy, sustained the low interest rates that fed Spain’s credit boom (Bibow 2017). The German surplus was not the cause of Spanish debt, but it was its accounting counterpart.

Spain, for its part, moved from an ‘unfinished Fordism’ to a post-Fordist model. To meet the criteria for monetary union, it liberalised, privatised and opened itself to foreign capital just when it most needed fiscal space for productive modernisation (Lozano and López, 2025). In response to successive crises, international programmes directly shaped wage policy and social spending (Becker and Jäger 2010). The difference was not only fiscal capacity: it reflected who had historically designed the rules and who received them as conditions.

This is also a story about who receives exceptions. Germany historically opposed any assistance not tied to strict conditionality. Next Generation EU and the suspension of fiscal rules after the pandemic broke with this pattern, but Germany ensured that the fund remained temporary, left earlier debts unshared and kept national vetoes in place. Solidarity is accepted, so long as it does not undermine the dominant pattern of accumulation.

The same pattern is visible today. Germany’s 2025 constitutional reform relaxed the debt brake, and Germany thereby allowed itself the flexibility it had denied to others. This fits Cox’s (1983) account of hegemony: the rules are formally universal, but exceptions tend to be initiated by the dominant state. Germany’s fiscal space has also been widened by European exceptions. Its deficit is projected to exceed 3% of GDP in 2026, but the Commission sees no case for an excessive deficit procedure: the national escape clause for defence means that without the rise in defence spending the deficit would stay below the reference value. That clause is formally open to all, but, again, it operates under supranational priorities that coincide, conveniently, with Germany’s own. Meanwhile, Germany has raised its 2026 growth forecast from 0.5% to 1.3%, after five years of stagnation, with special funds and defence spending boosting public investment.

Spain looks like the mirror image, but without the same kind of recovery. The IMF forecasts 2.5% growth in 2026, the fastest among the major advanced economies, yet Spain remains below the European Union average in income per head. The difference lies in what each growth is built on. Germany is using its new fiscal room to invest in infrastructure and defence, whereas Spain’s growth rests on Next Generation EU funds, immigration and service exports more than on productivity gains. This reflects a longer pattern that Amin (1974) describes as ‘extraversion’: credit, infrastructure and training are organised around export sectors, and wages are treated as a cost rather than a source of demand. What differs between countries is not the volume of exports but the productive structure behind them. In Spain, capital concentrated in sectors sheltered from international competition, and competing through labour costs left little room for technological upgrading (Cárdenas and Arribas 2025).

Part of the narrowing gap with Germany reflects the weakening of the northern benchmark, not shared development. Yet the German turn exposes the obsolescence of a mode of development centred on macroeconomic stability, fiscal austerity and cost competitiveness as the route to sustainable growth. If the country that benefited most from that model now needs debt-financed investment to grow, the model has lost the capacity to stabilise accumulation even for the centre. What is not yet clear is whether it will be replaced, or only adapted for those who can afford the adaptation.

A recovery financed by public debt breaks with the orthodoxy that the centre imposed on others and shows that the mode of regulation can bend when its core is under pressure. Whether this leads to a new mode of regulation is another matter:

  • Symmetry: will exceptions become rules open to every Member State, or will flexibility depend on the case each government can make?
  • Common capacity: does anything replace Next Generation EU, and what happens to the fiscal space of countries that cannot rewrite the rules?
  • Convergence: will the periphery be able to close the productivity gap, or keep growing by adding workers while the centre keeps its lead?

The answer will depend on struggle over accumulation strategies, and on which hegemonic bloc can impose its project.

Aglietta, M. 1979. A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience. London: NLB.

Amin, S. 1974. Accumulation on a World Scale. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Becker, J. and Jäger, J. 2010. ‘Development trajectories in the crisis in Europe’. Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe 18 (1): 5–27.

Bibow, J. 2017. ‘How Germany’s anti-Keynesianism has brought Europe to its knees’. Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No. 886.

Bieling, H.-J., Jäger, J. and Ryner, M. 2016. ‘Regulation theory and the political economy of the European Union’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 54 (1): 53–69.

Boyer, R., Chanteau, J.-P., Labrousse, A. and Lamarche, T. (eds) 2023. Théorie de la régulation: un nouvel état des savoirs. Paris: Dunod.

Cárdenas, L. and Arribas, J. 2025. The Political Economy of Mediterranean Europe: A Growth Models Perspective. London: Routledge.

Cox, R. W. 1983. ‘Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: an essay in method’. Millennium 12 (2): 162–175.

Lipietz, A. 1986. ‘Behind the crisis: the exhaustion of a regime of accumulation’. Review of Radical Political Economics 18 (1–2): 13–32.

Lozano Navarro, B. and López Castellano, F. 2025. ‘Institutional change and the new mode of development: the Spanish case (1975–2023)’. International Review of Applied Economics.

Stockhammer, E. 2011. ‘Peripheral Europe’s debt and German wages: the role of wage policy in the euro area’. International Journal of Public Policy 7 (1): 83–96.

van Apeldoorn, B. 2002. Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration. London: Routledge.

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Blanca Lozano Navarro is a Lecturer at Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.