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## **China and Africa: Implications for Advanced Donors<sup>1</sup>**

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### **Abstract**

This paper aims to analyze Chinese development aid in Africa in terms of economic and social development. This article begins with a discussion on the development of traditional aid regime and international aid architecture, and based on the literature review, this study analyzes Chinese aid in Africa and compares how Chinese aid is different from traditional donors. As an emerging donor, China has provided economic assistance to African countries based on South-South relationship, and this article aims to analyze how China as an emerging donor has performed in Africa, what is the impact of Chinese assistance, what are the problems in Chinese aid, and what can be the implications for advanced donors. This study attempts to discuss the implications of Chinese aid in the context of poverty reduction by examining how China responds to a new architecture of aid in historical perspectives. This paper reviews Chinese aid policy and characteristics and analyzes how China performs in Africa compared to other advanced donors. This paper concludes that economic and social development can be understood in the measurement not only of advanced donors but also of emerging donors. For China the consequences of aid means development in both recipient countries and China even though it has not been clearly defined how to measure it. In the end, this study argues that Chinese development assistance has an important influence in the international society in terms of how to measure and understand the results of assistance.

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<sup>1</sup> This paper is slightly modified from my PhD thesis.

## **I. Introduction**

Since the new millennium era, China has been spotlighted as an emerging donor, particularly in Africa, with its rapid economic growth in terms of GDP especially after the economic crisis in 2008. However, advanced countries have expressed their concerns in all donors to be in all countries and all sectors since new donors such as China, India and Russia have made new aid architecture more difficult to manage. For instance, there are controversial evaluations on why China provides aid to Africa and whether it brings positive effects in recipient countries. Yet, the agenda of aid effectiveness has not been limited to Chinese aid; rather, it has been contested with a mixture of different understandings amongst all traditional donor countries as well.

The history of official development aid goes back more than half a century with the emergence of 'development planning' in international community in the late 1940s, the Marshall Plan declared in 1947, and the inauguration address of Truman of 1949 initiated a new era of foreign aid regime (Edwards, 1999). At the beginning of the history of official aid, donor policies of aid and economic growth strongly related to their colonial experiences and political needs by reflecting the Cold War ideology. The characteristics of aid regime and paradigm have been influenced by several historical events such as oil shocks, food crises, financial crises and collapse of the Soviet bloc. Moving to the 1980s, widely embedded theories of economic growth and basic needs approach in the 1970s were replaced with the adjustment theory (Tarp, 2000: 36). From the 1980s neo-liberalism became dominant by taking the place of Keynesian beliefs and the policy harmonization through structural adjustment programs was attempted in the 1980s by reflecting neo-liberal thoughts. The 1990s witnessed more diversity in aid activities and more questions on aid effectiveness, and especially on the importance of good policy has been raised. At the end of the 1990s, the aid effectiveness comprehending social dimensions was addressed with selectivity on good governance, and harmonized approaches began to be taken into consideration. On the basis of the experience of the 1990s and before, the new millennium era has focused on the improvement of aid effectiveness. Based on the UN MDGs in 2000, milestones in aid effectiveness have followed as the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development in 2002, the Rome Declaration on Aid Harmonization in 2003, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, and the Accra Agenda for Action in 2008. Whilst focusing on aid effectiveness agenda, traditional forms of aid have changed from projects to programs, and most advanced donors began to provide budget support and sector wide approaches to achieve better consequences of aid practice.

In regard, this study attempts to examine whether China as an emerging donor conforms to the existing policy language in place or chooses a different form of dialogue and engagement under the international aid architecture. Based on field research and interviews as well as its thorough analysis on existing resources, firstly in Section II, this study explores Chinese foreign aid in historical aspects and Chinese aid policy in Africa. Section III analyzes the characteristics of Chinese aid and Section IV discusses how China understands effectiveness of aid. Finally in Section V, this paper summarizes how Chinese aid has been different from traditional donors and what can be the implications for advanced donors from Chinese aid in Africa.

## **II. Development of Chinese Aid Policy and Africa**

This study provides the period from 1949 to 1976 as the first stage of Chinese aid, since this duration is from the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to the economic opening. In its first stage, China mainly focused on the Asian regions, and it began to provide grant-type aid to Africa as well. During this period, China was receiving aid from the former Soviet Union, and overseas aid from China to others stemmed from ideological motivation (Li, 2008). In the 1960s, when Maoist China opposed the Soviet Union, its third world policy was much more aggressive than before and China provided diplomatic and military support to southern Africa to commit ideologically to liberation movements (Alden and Alves, 2008: 48). Chinese African liberation movement support that time was attributed to geopolitical interests (Mohan and Power, 2008). In the mid-1960s when Maoist's Cultural Revolution dominated China, its slogan of 'exporting revolution' became the primary objective in Africa and as a result only a few groups of African countries such as the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party remained as partners of the Chinese government (Li, 2007: 71). After the failure of the Cultural Revolution, China changed the strategy from exporting revolution to 'free and unconditional' aid policy in Africa (Li, 2007: 71). Chinese free and unconditional policy can be seen clearly in the Tanzania-Zambia project between 1970 and 1976. According to a high-level government official from the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM) (Interviewee A, 2008), China was the only donor country on this huge project, which has been one of the best practices in Africa. From 1970 to 1976, China successfully established diplomatic ties with 20 African countries; 39 countries recognized the government in Beijing and only eight African countries remained in the diplomatic relation with Taipei by 1976 (Alden and Alves, 2008: 51). With the efforts of the Chinese government providing aid regardless of an ideological notion of recipients, China managed to re-emerge in the

global society in the 1970s.

The second phase of Chinese aid is from 1976 when Mao died to 1989 at the end of the Soviet bloc and the Tiananmen Square massacre. In 1982 during the 12<sup>th</sup> National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), China pronounced its new 'independent policy' of continuing anti-imperialism in the third world countries; the new policy officially emphasized the change from 'war and revolution' to 'peace and development' and from 'economy serves diplomacy' to 'diplomacy serves the economy' (Li, 2007: 72; Alden and Alves, 2008: 52). At the same time, the 'Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence' still played a guidance role in policy towards other developing countries to 'promote solidarity and call for the development of economic and cultural relations; cultural pacts endorsing exchange of students, educators, reporters and other groups; trade and payment agreements intended to promote commercial relations; and economic aid and technical assistance agreements through which China has provided financial assistance and know-how in many different fields' (Alden and Alves, 2008: 48; Interviewee A, 2008; Xue, 2008). The new principles were created based on 'Independence, Complete Equality, Mutual Respect and Non-interference in Others' Internal Affairs' (Li, 2007: 72). When the Chinese government announced its new policy in 1982, Chinese aid policy in Africa was also extensively changed from ideological orientation to economic development; China emphasized economic and trade cooperation, cultural and educational exchange, medical and public health, military exchange and non-governmental communications in Africa (Li, 2007; Alden and Alves, 2008).

In the 1980s, China focused more on the self-reliance of African countries based on previous experience and historical lessons; it was realized that aid itself did not significantly change African poverty (Li, 2007). At the same time, whereas the new Chinese policy attributed economic cooperation, most aid was given to an infrastructure which could boost more foreign investment in Africa as well as to rich raw materials in the African region, and this policy focusing on energy security continued to the mid-1990s (Li, 2007; Mohan and Power, 2008). From the late 1970s to 1989, China began to normalize the Sino-Soviet relationship and establish formal relations with the US to attract western investment in the four 'special economic zones' of the coastal capitalist enclaves (Alden and Alves, 2008: 52). As a result, in Africa, geopolitical and ideological war between China and the former Soviet Union diminished (Yu, 1988: 857, cited in Alden and Alves, 2008: 52).

In Africa, overall, China has 'gradually changed its tactics from confrontation to cooperation from revolution to economic development, and from isolation to

international engagement' in Sino-African relations (Muekalia, 2004: 7, cited in Mohan and Power, 2008: 27). Chinese policy towards Africa has been based on anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and later anti-US hegemon by emphasizing the similarities between China and African countries and South-South cooperation with mutual development and self-reliance (Li, 2007; Alden and Alves, 2008; Interviewee A, 2008; Mohan and Power, 2008).

The third stage of China's aid can be seen from 1989. Since 1989, China seemed to be more practical (Xue, 2008). After the collapse of the Soviet bloc and following the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, Chinese focus on Africa became stronger whereas western donors did not pay attention to aid to Africa after the Cold War (Li, 2007; Alden and Alves, 2008). In 1990, China's aid recorded USD 374.6 million in 43 African countries, compared to the aid amount of USD 60.4 million in 13 African countries in 1988 (Taylor, 2004: 87). In comparison, the amount of Chinese aid to Africa was USD 2.2 billion in 1988 (Snow, 1995: 318).

In the 1990s, there were two significant factors in Chinese aid policy: 1) China focused on the policy to regain Africa's interests and it pursued a more practical approach to have new commercial engagements to increase China's economy; and 2) as an emerging global power, China did not neglect its game with Taiwan (Alden and Alves, 2008; Mohan and Power, 2008). China maintained use of its aid to Africa as a tool in the sovereignty struggle with Taiwan in the international society (Alden and Alves, 2008; Mohan and Power, 2008). In 1996, China suffered a threat to its relations with Western countries due to the Taiwan missile crisis. Accordingly, President Jiang Zemin visited Kenya, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mali, Namibia and Zimbabwe in 1996 to strengthen the political support from African countries and signed more than 20 agreements on trade and economic, technical and cultural cooperation according to an article on President's Visit to Six African Countries (FMPRC, 17 November 2000).

During the Africa-Asia tours, Jiang developed the initial idea of a Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), and it was launched in October 2000 (Alden and Alves, 2008; Mohan and Power, 2008). The FOCAC has been a principle channel for economic diplomacy to promote dialogue and cooperation between China and Africa (KIET, 2006; Mohan and Power, 2008). The first FOCAC was held in Beijing in 2000, second meeting was gathered in Addis Ababa in 2003, and the third was held again in Beijing in 2006. Recently, in 2009, the fourth FOCAC was held and both Chinese and African leaders adopted the Declaration of Sharm el-Sheikh and the Sharm el-Sheikh Action Plan.

While the Washington Consensus prevailed in the 1980s, the 'Beijing Consensus' appeared in the discourse in the late 1990s and in the early 2000s initially based on the establishment of the FOCAC (Kang, 2007). Whereas the Washington Consensus and neo-liberalism were seen as new colonial practices in developing countries (Mohan and Power, 2008), it seemed that the Beijing Consensus could alternate as a new model for developing countries for a peaceful and smooth economic take-off based on 'peaceful coexistence' and 'peaceful rise strategy' (Ramo, 2004). China's unconditional aid has stemmed from the Beijing Consensus and its 'soft power' has been strongly engaged in economic cooperation with Africa (Kang, 2007). However, Chinese 'renewed interests' in Africa do not seem to be much different from the neo-liberal western powers of the Washington Consensus (Harvey, 2005, cited in Mohan and Power, 2008: 31). Not only that, there is a concern that recent aid practice of China can bring another tragedy of 'Dutch Disease' in the African continent (CCS, 2006; Kang, 2007). The strong Chinese nexus in Africa is not only due to geopolitical and strategic reasons, but also due to the lack of energy (KOTRA, 2008). On the other hand, others like Kaplinsky (2008) believe that the Chinese approach in Africa is much more 'coordinated' than that of previous colonial powers. The following section discusses the characteristics of Chinese aid in order to compare with traditional forms of aid by advanced donors.

### **III. Characteristics of Chinese Aid**

It is necessary to define how China considers 'aid'. Instead of using aid from donor to recipient, China seems to prefer using 'assistance' based on good friendship between two South-South countries for mutual benefit or mutual development. While the rest of the world perceives the Chinese march into Africa confusingly with aid giving, in fact most of the Chinese cash flow into Africa has been formed as investments and loans, or in more concrete forms such as infrastructure construction. According to researchers like McCormick (2008), Chinese aid consists of monetary and non-monetary aid such as grants and loans for infrastructure, plant and equipment, scholarships, and training and technical assistance. On the other hand, international organizations like OECD explain the forms of Chinese aid in three ways: grant aid (MOFCOM); zero-interest loans (MOFCOM); and concessional loans (China Exim Bank) (Reisen and Ndoye, 2008). According to a Chinese government official, most Chinese aid can be in the form of projects (Interviewee A, 2008). Moreover, according to the OECD, Chinese aid can be called an investment by the government or often confused between technical cooperation, investment and aid (Reisen and Ndoye, 2008).

However, referring to the government official, Chinese aid needs to be understood separately between project aid, including training and technical cooperation and economic cooperation including investment (Interviewee A, 2008).

Since it is known that China does not have dedicated aid agency that is designated solely for aid, there are varied understandings of the Chinese aid management system. According to Brautigam (2007, cited in Reisen and Ndoye, 2008: 37), the main institution of Chinese bilateral aid to Africa is the China Exim Bank; however, the government officials (Interviewee B, 2008) and some researchers like Lancaster (2007) analyze that it is the MOFCOM. Chinese development aid is rather led by the MOFCOM, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and Development, and the Chinese Association for International Understanding cooperate with the lead of the MOFCOM in terms of foreign aid (Interviewee B, 2008). As presented by Davies (2007: 44-45), State Council works as the highest 'executive organ' among the players in the Chinese aid system, the MOFCOM is the main 'government body in charge of Chinese aid' and it has a Department of Aid to Foreign Countries, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs to participate in the decision-making process for policy formulation, a Ministry of Finance which exists for budgeting, embassies and Economic and Commercial Counselor's Office which monitor and implement projects and follow up reporting on progress. However, the capacity is very limited, and Exim Bank provides export credits and loans for construction contracts and investment projects.

Meanwhile, the International Poverty Reduction Center in China (IPRCC) was jointly established by the Chinese government and the UNDP in 2005 to share the experience in poverty reduction, to promote poverty reduction progress, to conduct practical research, to optimize poverty reduction policies, to advance international exchanges in regard with poverty reduction, and to facilitate collaboration in the international community (IPRCC, 2008). With the Chinese government and UNDP, the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB) and British Department for International Development (DFID) are the members of the Board of Trustees of this center. Ever since then, the IPRCC has organized international conferences, workshops and meetings on poverty reduction and foreign aid issues with research and poverty reduction activities. However, advanced donors and international institutions tend to criticize the strong bilateral aid mechanism of China as well as the unsystematic aid practice of the Chinese government (Li, 2007; Reisen and Ndoye, 2008). However, it seems that China deals more sensitively with international pressure in regard to issues such as human rights and the rule of its own bilateral aid over the Olympic Games in

2008 and the Shanghai Cultural Capital of the World in 2010 (Alden and Alves, 2008). At the same time, despite China's preference for bilateral practices in aid giving, it also provides aid throughout multilateral institutions.

Whilst most researchers criticize Chinese motivation in aid giving, the Chinese government and some researchers provide a counterargument. Referring to Hong Xue (2008), Director of the Development and Aid Research Division in International Trade and Economic Cooperation Institute of the MOFCOM in China, the Chinese government has provided grants and loans with 'no interests or low interests' to over 100 countries since 1949. Chinese aid is not a North-South relationship but rather a South-South relationship, pursuing mutual assistance and mutual benefit (Interviewee A, 2008). China is a recipient of development aid and a donor at the same time. However, this is somewhat different from others who criticize that China has been offering aid or investment based on its geopolitical and strategic interests in energy including oil and raw materials (for example, Lancaster, 2007; Reisen and Ndoye, 2008). The Chinese government official explains that the viewpoint of the world which tends to emphasize Chinese interests in oil fields has been exaggerated (Interviewee A, 2008). China now has relations with 52 African nations, and out of these few countries produce oil; China has relations with Nigeria and Sudan where the global society focuses on the oil issue, but it is also true that China has longer and stronger relations with other African countries like Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, Tanzania and Zambia regardless of the oil, and especially in Tanzania, the amount of aid is much higher than in Sudan and Nigeria (Interviewee A, 2008).

McCormick (2008) points out that Chinese aid policy is not only based on oil interest but also based on the interest to become a major political and economic power in the international society. At the same time, the government official pointed out during the interview that the volume of Japanese aid is much higher than Chinese, but the international society tends to focus on Chinese aid due to the rivalry with the US. However, based on the analysis of recent press releases, it seems that China does have a strong nexus with natural resources in Africa including oil by providing 'gifts' to these African countries. For instance, excluding oil cases, in 2009 only, China made a USD 2.6 billion mining agreement of iron ore in Liberia (Butty, 2009), provided USD 95 million loan for an uranium mining project in Niger (Lewis, 2009), and created a consortium on gold in Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 16 May 2009). Some of these are made between Chinese corporations and recipient governments but negotiations have been processed by the China Union as a company bid for projects.



Whilst the characteristics of Chinese aid seem to be unlike traditional donors, understanding of Chinese aid effectiveness has been also slightly different from advanced donors as follows.

#### **IV. Understanding of Chinese Aid Effectiveness**

While China has used aid as a tool against colonialism, the British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw stated in 2006 that Chinese aid practice in Africa now seems to be the same as the UK did 150 years before (Straw, 2006, cited in Mohan and Power, 2008: 23). However, the Chinese government argues that this is not true since China's aid practice in Africa is based on South-South relations, and not from imperialist country to developing country (Interviewee A, 2008). At the same time, it has been said that Chinese projects seem to be more effective than Western donors' aid practice which is based on monies in Africa (Interviewee A, 2008). As in an article on the Chinese Energy Safari in Africa, the President of Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete stated during the African Economic Forum in 2006 that China 'is a real contributor to Africa's development' (JoongAng Daily, 24 July 2006). However, this does not apply to all African countries. The President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki argued that Africa 'would be condemned to underdevelopment' if China repeated the 'colonial relationship' of the Western powers in Africa, prior to Chinese president Hu Jintao's visit in 2006 (Brookes, 2007 & Servant, 2005, cited in Mohan and Power, 2008: 23).

It is in the early stage to discuss the impact of Chinese aid in African countries; however, some advanced donors have already questioned whether Chinese aid can improve economic and political reforms in Africa (Lancaster, 2007). However, there have been few empirical researches on Chinese aid impact on social aspects. At the same time, when analyzing the impact of Chinese aid in Africa, not only the economic aspect but also cultural issues should be considered. There are growing numbers of Chinese migration to Africa as a source of remittances and as the opportunity of new jobs for Chinese (Mohan and Power, 2008). Nevertheless, referring to the interview with the government official, Chinese aid does not only expect to bring economic and social development in recipient countries, but also to build good 'friendship'. In this sense, the relationship should be one of the categories to evaluate aid effectiveness in the case of the PRC (Interviewee A, 2008).

As China does not have any centralized aid agency like other donors, the country has not developed a monitoring and evaluating system although the government is willing to have one in the future (Lancaster, 2007). In view of this, a high-level government official argues that it would be obvious how much China's aid positively

influenced in Africa's economic and social development when asking the local people since China's aid projects have been based on recipients' needs and they can have more feasible outcomes (Interviewee A, 2008). For example, whereas Belgium built roads only for the extraction of resources in the DRC, China constructed or improved roads which were suitable not only for the transportation of the resources but also for citizens who can use the roads to travel (Li, 2007: 79). At the same time, while Western countries were not interested in technical assistance and cooperation in science and technology which African countries wanted to receive, China has expanded its support in these issues (Li, 2007).

Further, international institutions such as OECD are concerned with the problem of debt burden in African countries. In regard to Reisen and Ndoye (2008) in the OECD Development Center Working Paper, Chinese export credits can be categorized as the 'forbidden loans' which are neither export credits as defined by the 'OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits', nor sufficiently concessional, and these forbidden loans can make countries less debt tolerant. Here, the government official of the MOFCOM emphasizes that Chinese aid is not the same as that of the OECD members and its volume is not as high. Thus, it is not suitable to apply the OECD rule to Chinese aid when monitoring Chinese aid performances (Interviewee A, 2008). In addition, it is true that the Chinese government has relieved about 374 debts and signed a protocol on debt relief in 49 countries of Africa, Asia, the Caribbean Area and the South Pacific islands (Xue, 2008). At the same time, it has been argued that Chinese mutual benefit policy applies to areas like fair trade and debt reduction (Li, 2007).

In terms of the international trend in the effectiveness of aid, the government official gives his opinion that the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (UN MDGs) and indicators of the Paris Declaration are meaningful, but the definition of aid effectiveness can be different in different countries and the indicators are not suitable to the situation of China (Interviewee A, 2008). Here, it can be questioned whether a one-fits-all type definition of aid effectiveness of the OECD donors can be applicable to all donors regardless of their stage of aid experience. At the same time, the amount of aid is a lot more needed in Africa even after the MDGs agreement of Western donors; in this reality, Chinese participation in the aid architecture itself can be helpful to satisfy Africa's needs (Kang, 2007). Besides, according to Xue (2008), China attempts to strengthen the effectiveness and transparency of foreign aid based on the following three basic attitudes introduced in the *Beijing Action Plan 2007-2009*: 1) China will gradually increase the scale of foreign aid; 2) China insists on promoting South-North

dialogue and strengthening South-South cooperation; and 3) China believes that under the new conditions, the international community should keep carrying out cooperation, strengthen communication and coordination between countries and international organizations, share valuable experience and methods in foreign aid, set up various kinds of mutual trust mechanisms, especially the emergency rescue mechanism directed to accidental disasters, and quickly and effectively handle the disasters and accidents with joint effort. It has been clearly stated by Li (2008) that China's aid is 'a means of support and a means of making change' in social and cultural aspects as well as in political economy. Chinese unconditionality is a strategy for aid effectiveness, and China's aid transaction cost is also effective in aid due to its less complicated procedure and lack of expensive studies (Li, 2008). However, the differences in policies, strategies, mechanisms and modalities of aid between advanced donors and China still remains as problems (Kang, 2007). For instance, even though China signed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, especially concerning donor cooperation, China still maintains a stronger bilateralism over multilateralism (Mohan and Power, 2008).

It has been also questioned whether China has the capacity to undertake statistical analysis or analysis on aid results (Lancaster, 2007); however, since the establishment of the IPRCC, China has evaluated projects based on the satisfaction questionnaires done by African people (Li, 2008). At the same time, the government of the PRC expressed that the FOCAC 2006 'fully' revealed the achievements and effectiveness of the Chinese government in foreign aid (Xue, 2008). Nevertheless, as Lancaster (2007: 4) analyzes, needless to say, China has not taken 'on all the perplexities and paraphernalia of results management'.

## **V. Concluding Remarks**

The characteristics of Chinese aid are unlike advanced donors, and it is a lot less influenced by international aid architecture. This can be because 1) China is not a complete donor country yet; and 2) it has a serious domestic poverty problem to deal with. In terms of the motivation, Chinese aid has been led by ideological and geopolitical interests. Recently, energy issues are also strongly involved in Chinese aid policy in Africa. In the context of aid impact, China is not yet ready for the systemic evaluation approach even though it expresses its effort to bring aid effectiveness into Africa. China tends to use its own historical experience in aid practice based on a strong bilateralism. At the same time, China seems to emphasize the South-South relation in its aid practice with recipients, which implicates China in having less interest in policy dialogue and engagement with other donor countries.

This study concludes that economic and social development in the context of aid effectiveness should be understood in the measurement not only of advanced donors, but also of emerging donors. For China the effectiveness of aid means development in both recipient countries and China. It is not easy to measure to what extent Chinese aid can influence African countries' development. However, it is noteworthy that the advanced countries' long-term impact has been controversial as well. It would be critical to develop practical methodology to assess aid effectiveness in recipient countries by considering different aspects of each donor policy and practice. At the same time, as further study, how these policies have been realized in practice and how much these can actually contribute to aid consequences should be considered.

In the end, this study interprets that current international aid architecture is dominated by so-called advanced donors, and the new donors such as China have not been yet integrated in this architecture. Notwithstanding the dominance of traditional donors in the aid architecture, it would be very interesting to foresee how China plays the role in Africa in coming years. The volume of Chinese assistance into Africa is increasing, and it is estimated to be as important as other traditional donors in this continent. In this light, how China plays its role in the aid architecture from now on can be an important variable to characterize the future aid regime.

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